Heraclitus, Change and Objective Contradictions in Aristotle’s \(\it Metaphysics\) \(\Gamma\)

  • In \(\it Metaphysics\) \(\Gamma\), Aristotle argues against those who seem to accept contradictions. He distinguishes between the Sophists, who deny the principle of non-contradiction through arguments, and the Natural Philosophers, whose physical investigations lead to the acceptance of objective contradictions. Heraclitus’ name appears throughout the discussion. Usually, he is associated with the discussion against the Sophists. In this paper, I explore how the discussion with the Natural Philosophers may illuminate both the interpretation of Heraclitus by Aristotle and Heraclitus’ own worldview. To refute the Natural Philosophers, Aristotle proposes a general reconstruction of their reasoning. Roughly, relying on sensory evidence (A1), they see that the same thing changes from one opposite to another (A2). Such a change appears to characterize a generation out of non-being, which a Natural Philosopher does not accept (A3). To solve the problem, despite their different worldviews, Natural Philosophers hint at a state in which opposites co-occur, characterizing an objective contradiction (C). Looking at the discussion in \(\it Metaphysics\) \(\Gamma\) and Heraclitus fragments, sections 1–3 show how assumptions A1, A2, and A3 easily apply to Heraclitus. The case of the conclusion is more challenging. In the case of the Pluralists, the co-existence of opposites characterizes a state in which there is no generation. Such a view does not fit Heraclitus’ mobilism. To argue that Aristotle’s argument is general enough to encompass dynamic views, I examine his problematization of accepting the change of change in \(\textit {Metaphysics K}\) and \(\textit {Physics V}\). There, after re-stating several points that appear in \(\it Metaphysics\) \(\Gamma\), Aristotle argues that accepting the becoming of another becoming leads to a state of contradiction in which the becoming is perishing. Heraclitus’ B8, cited in Nicomachean Ethics, gives evidence that, for Aristotle, Heraclitus puts a process at the origin of an opposite process. Moreover, after examining the expression "living the death/dying the life" in B62, I argue that Heraclitus was aware that his worldview implied a dynamic objective contradiction. Finally, an analysis of elemental changes in B36 proves that accepting objective contradictions does not make Heraclitus’ worldview less attractive.

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Metadaten
Author:Celso VieiraORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-121869
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2022-0012
Parent Title (English):Rhizomata
Publisher:De Gruyter
Place of publication:Berlin
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2024/12/04
Date of first Publication:2023/01/13
Publishing Institution:Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek
Tag:Heraclitus; \(\it Metaphysics\) \(\Gamma\)
Aristotle; Principle of Non-contradiction; Process Philosophy
Volume:10
Issue:2
First Page:183
Last Page:214
Institutes/Facilities:Lehrstuhl für Philosophie der Antike und des Mittelalters
Dewey Decimal Classification:Philosophie und Psychologie / Philosophie
open_access (DINI-Set):open_access
faculties:Fakultät für Philosophie und Erziehungswissenschaft
Licence (English):License LogoCreative Commons - CC BY-NC 4.0 - Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International