Attentional structure and phenomenal unity

  • Some authors argue that phenomenal unity can be grounded in the attentional structure of consciousness, which endows conscious states with at least a foreground and a background. Accordingly, the phenomenal character of part of a conscious state comprises a content aspect (e.g., hearing music) and a structural aspect (e.g., being in the background). This view presents the concern that such a structure does not bring about phenomenal unity, but phenomenal segregation, since the background is separated from the foreground. I argue that attention can still lead to a form of phenomenal unity that connects the foreground with the background. Experiencing oneself as controlling the focus of attention can, at least occasionally, bring about an experienced connection between the attentional foreground and the attentional background of a conscious experience.

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Metadaten
Author:Wanja WieseORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-99185
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0197
Parent Title (English):Open philosophy
Publisher:De Gruyter
Place of publication:Berlin
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2023/05/25
Date of first Publication:2022/02/21
Publishing Institution:Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek
Tag:Open Access Fonds
attention; consciousness; phenomenalunity
Volume:5
Issue:1
First Page:254
Last Page:264
Note:
Article Processing Charge funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the Open Access Publication Fund of Ruhr-Universität Bochum.
Institutes/Facilities:Institut für Philosophie II
Dewey Decimal Classification:Philosophie und Psychologie / Philosophie
open_access (DINI-Set):open_access
faculties:Fakultät für Philosophie und Erziehungswissenschaft
Licence (English):License LogoCreative Commons - CC BY 4.0 - Attribution 4.0 International