True lies and Moorean redundancy
- According to the subjective view of lying, speakers can lie by asserting a true proposition, as long as they believe this proposition to be false. This view contrasts with the objective view, according to which lying requires the actual falsity of the proposition asserted. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to pairs of assertions that differ only in intuitively redundant content and to show that such pairs of assertions are a reason to favour the subjective view of lying over the objective one.
| Author: | Alex WiegmannGND, Emanuel ViebahnGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-100680 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03366-3 |
| Parent Title (English): | Synthese |
| Publisher: | Springer Science + Business Media B.V. |
| Place of publication: | Dordrecht |
| Document Type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 2023/08/28 |
| Date of first Publication: | 2021/08/23 |
| Publishing Institution: | Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek |
| Tag: | Definition of lying; Moore's paradox; Moorean redundancy; Objective view of lying; Subjective view of lying |
| Volume: | 199 |
| First Page: | 13053 |
| Last Page: | 13066 |
| Note: | Dieser Beitrag ist auf Grund des DEAL-Springer-Vertrages frei zugänglich. |
| Institutes/Facilities: | Institut für Philosophie II |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | Philosophie und Psychologie / Philosophie |
| open_access (DINI-Set): | open_access |
| faculties: | Fakultät für Philosophie und Erziehungswissenschaft |
| Licence (English): |  Creative Commons - CC BY 4.0 - Attribution 4.0 International |
