Self-defense

  • I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.

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Metadaten
Author:Shaun GallagherGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-68096
DOI:https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01612
Parent Title (English):Frontiers in psychology
Subtitle (English):deflecting deflationary and eliminativist critiques of the sense of ownership
Publisher:Frontiers Research Foundation
Place of publication:Lausanne
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2019/12/10
Date of first Publication:2017/09/21
Publishing Institution:Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek
Tag:deflationary account; mineness; minimal self; phenomenology; sense of agency; sense of ownership
Volume:8
First Page:1612-1
Last Page:1612-10
Institutes/Facilities:Institut für Philosophie II
open_access (DINI-Set):open_access
faculties:Fakultät für Philosophie und Erziehungswissenschaft
Licence (English):License LogoCreative Commons - CC BY 4.0 - Attribution 4.0 International